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OFF-COURT MISBEHAVIOR: SPORTS 
LEAGUES AND PRIVATE PUNISHMENT 
JANINE YOUNG KIM* & MATTHEW J. PARLOW** 
This Essay examines how professional sports leagues address 
(apparently increasing) criminal activity by players off of the field or court.  
It analyzes the power of professional sports leagues and, in particular, the 
commissioners of those leagues, to discipline wayward athletes.  Such 
discipline is often met with great controversy—from players’ unions and 
commentators alike—especially when a commissioner invokes the “in the 
best interest of the sport” clause of the professional sports league’s 
constitution and bylaws.  The Essay then contextualizes such league 
discipline in criminal punishment theory—juxtaposing punishment norms in 
public law with incentives and rationales for discipline in professional 
sports—and analyzes the legal and cultural limitations to this approach. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Hardly a day goes by without news of misbehavior by a professional 
athlete.  In the month of February 2009, for example, the media reported 
such misbehavior on at least twenty-two out of twenty-eight days.1  Often, 
such misconduct involves criminal behavior by an athlete that occurs off the 
athletic field or court.2  Some have suggested that professional athletes are 
particularly prone to criminal behavior.3  Others have countered that this is 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; J.D., Yale Law School; 
M.A., B.A., Stanford University. 
** Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; J.D., Yale Law 
School; B.A., Loyola Marymount University.  The authors wish to thank Professors Paul 
Anderson, Matt Mitten, and Michael O’Hear for their comments on an earlier draft of this 
Essay, and Stephen Howitz, Michael Miner, Katie Tornberg, and Ashley Wilson for their 
research assistance.  We would also like to thank Marquette University Law School for its 
financial support. 
1 Copies of these news stories are on file with the authors. 
2 Of the twenty-two stories, twenty-one involved arguably criminal behavior, with only 
one article involving non-criminal behavior. 
3 See, e.g., Joel Michael Ugolini, Even a Violent Game Has Its Limits: A Look at the 
NFL’s Responsibility for the Behavior of Its Players, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 41, 44-45 (2007) 
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merely a perception created by greater media scrutiny of professional 
athletes.4 
Whether such criminality is perceived or real, sports leagues have 
begun to take a firmer stand on disciplining athletes for their transgressions.  
Commissioners of these leagues are imposing harsher and more frequent 
penalties when athletes commit criminal acts.5  This trend raises interesting 
questions regarding the authority of professional sports leagues to punish 
athletes for such misbehavior.  Leagues’ exercise of punitive authority over 
public, criminal acts by individuals also calls for a theoretical analysis that 
explores the relationship between private and public criminal law in the 
sports law context. 
Part II of this Essay begins this analysis by describing the power of 
professional sports leagues, and, in particular, the commissioners of those 
leagues, to discipline their athletes for criminal acts committed off the court 
or field.  In addition, this Part analyzes courts’ and arbitrators’ treatment of 
these private acts of punishment.  Part III explores the reasons why 
professional sports leagues discipline their athletes for such misbehavior.  
Part IV traces the rise of private punishment, as distinct from public law 
punishment.  Part V grapples with the question of whether a professional 
sports league’s discipline of its athletes for off-the-court or off-the-field 
criminal acts should be construed as public or private punishment, 
especially in light of the reasons discussed in Part III.  Finally, this Essay 
concludes by reflecting on the significance of this recent development in 
sports and criminal law. 
 
(casting doubt on a study demonstrating that professional football players are less criminal 
than other males of the same age and race). 
4 See, e.g., Laurie Nicole Robinson, Comment, Professional Athletes Held to a Higher 
Standard and Above the Law: A Comment on High-Profile Criminal Defendants and the 
Need for States to Establish High-Profile Courts, 73 IND. L.J. 1313, 1327 (1998); see also 
Jared Chamberlain et al., Celebrities in the Courtroom: Legal Responses, Psychological 
Theory and Empirical Research, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 551, 565 (2006) (“Research has 
found that athletes are stereotyped by the public as violent, drug abusing, and lacking 
intelligence.”).  One scholar explores journalists’ motivations for covering such stories and 
what that trend says about popular culture, sports, and news reporting.  See Robinson, supra, 
at 1324 (recalling a time when the media protected professional athletes as one where 
athletes and reporters made similar salaries and were both predominantly white).  See 
generally David Ray Papke, Athletes in Trouble with the Law: Journalistic Accounts for the 
Resentful Fan, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 449 (2001). 
5 In fact, commissioners of professional sports leagues are beginning to punish athletes 
for behavior off of the court or field that may not be criminal in nature, but which may bring 
disrepute and embarrassment to the league.  See infra Part III.  While these instances pose an 
interesting tension in the context of private punishment, they are outside the scope of this 
Essay. 
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II. AUTHORITY AND PROCEDURE 
A. SOURCES OF POWER 
The power of professional sports leagues to discipline athletes for 
criminal activity off the court or field is relatively clear and settled, yet 
highly controversial.  Across the four main professional sports leagues,6 
“commissioners and/or presidents of the various professional sports leagues 
notoriously possess dominant powers in governing league matters.”7  In 
these sports leagues, the commissioners’ powers derive, in part, from league 
constitutions and bylaws.8  These general powers include the authority to 
punish athletes for criminal acts committed outside the scope of play.  In 
particular, constitutions, bylaws, and collective bargaining agreements of 
the major sports leagues contain provisions granting commissioners the 
authority to discipline players for acts deemed not in the “best interest” of 
the sport.9 
The “best interest” clause developed in Major League Baseball (MLB) 
in response to the Chicago Black Sox scandal during the 1919 World 
Series, where gamblers bribed players to throw the coveted baseball 
championship.10  After the scandal, MLB consolidated power in a newly 
created Commissioner11 and appointed Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis as 
 
6 The four main professional sports leagues are widely understood to be Major League 
Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Association (NBA), the National Hockey League 
(NHL), and the National Football League (NFL). 
7 RAY YASSER ET AL., SPORTS LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 379 (2006). 
8 Id. at 380. 
9 See MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. II, § 2 (authorizing the MLB Commissioner to 
discipline athletes who act in a manner “not in the best interests of . . . baseball”); NAT’L 
BASKETBALL ASS’N CONST. & BYLAWS art. XXXV(d) (granting the NBA Commissioner the 
power to discipline “any Player who, in [the Commissioner’s] opinion, shall have been 
guilty of conduct prejudicial . . . or detrimental to the [NBA]”); NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE 
CONST. & BYLAWS § 17.3(a) (granting the NHL Commissioner the authority to discipline an 
athlete whose conduct, “whether during or outside the playing season has been dishonorable, 
prejudicial to or against the welfare of the League or the game of Hockey”); NAT’L 
FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONST. & BYLAWS art. VIII; NFL MGMT. COUNCIL & NFL PLAYERS 
ASS’N, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006-2012 app. C, ¶ 15 (2006) (enabling 
the NFL Commissioner to discipline an athlete who acts in a manner that is “detrimental to 
the League or professional football”); see also MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND 
REGULATION 436 (2005) (noting the best interest of the sport power); Jason M. Pollack, Note, 
Take My Arbitrator, Please: Commissioner “Best Interests” Disciplinary Authority in 
Professional Sports, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1645 (1999) (discussing the best interest power in 
different professional sports leagues). 
10 Robert I. Lockwood, Note, The Best Interests of the League: Referee Betting Scandal 
Brings Commissioner Authority and Collective Bargaining Back to the Forefront in the 
NBA, 15 SPORTS LAW. J. 137, 141-44 (2008). 
11 Id. at 141. 
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its first Commissioner.12  Among the powers of the new Commissioner was 
the authority “to impose punishment and pursue legal remedies for any 
conduct . . . that [the Commissioner] determined to be detrimental to the 
best interests of the game . . . .”13  The MLB Commissioner’s broad 
authority was reinforced in Milwaukee American Ass’n v. Landis,14 where 
the court acknowledged that “the commissioner is given almost unlimited 
discretion in the determination of whether or not a certain state of facts 
creates a situation detrimental to the national game of baseball.”15   
Other professional sports leagues later adopted similar provisions in 
their respective constitutions and bylaws.  The commissioner’s power under 
such a clause varies a bit from league to league, but it is similar in nature, 
particularly in how it generally grants indeterminate discretion to the 
commissioner in considering and meting out such discipline.16  This 
seemingly boundless discretion, which is further discussed below with 
regard to arbitration and judicial review, has been the source of much 
controversy and criticism.17  It is worth noting that the scope of the 
commissioner’s best interest powers may be limited by the particular 
league’s collective bargaining agreement.18 
Two additional sources provide commissioners with the power to 
discipline athletes for misbehavior19: individual player contracts and the 
 
12 J.C.H. Jones & Kenneth G. Stewart, Hit Somebody: Hockey Violence, Economics, the 
Law, and the Twist and McSorley Decisions, 12 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 165, 194 (2002). 
13 Matthew B. Pachman, Note, Limits on the Discretionary Powers of Professional 
Sports Commissioners: A Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the Pete Rose 
Controversy, 76 VA. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (1990).  Interestingly, Judge Landis would only 
accept the newly created position if the MLB Commissioner had such broad authority and 
power.  See Shayna M. Sigman, The Jurisprudence of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, 15 
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 277, 301 (2005). 
14 49 F.2d 298 (N.D. Ill. 1931). 
15 Id. at 303. 
16 See Kimberly M. Trebon, Note, There Is No “I” in Team: The Commission of Group 
Sexual Assault by Collegiate and Professional Athletes, 4 J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
65, 91-93 (2007).  But see Pachman, supra note 13, at 1415. 
17 See Brent D. Showalter, Technical Foul: David Stern’s Excessive Use of Rule-Making 
Authority, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 205 (2007); Michael A. Mahone, Jr., Note, Sentencing 
Guidelines for the Court of Public Opinion: An Analysis of the National Football League’s 
Revised Personal Conduct Policy, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 181 (2008); Adam B. Marks, 
Note, Personnel Foul on the National Football League Players Association: How Union 
Executive Director Gene Upshaw Failed the Union’s Members by Not Fighting the 
Enactment of the Personal Conduct Policy, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1581 (2008). 
18 See Lockwood, supra note 10, at 154 (noting that the 1995 NBA collective bargaining 
agreement limited the commissioner’s power to discipline as compared to the previous 
collective bargaining agreement). 
19 These sources of commissioner power are noteworthy because they derive from 
collective bargaining between the leagues and their respective players’ unions.  See Matthew 
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collective bargaining agreements of each league.20  For example, the 
standard NBA player’s contract contains a “good moral character” clause.21  
This clause allows a team to terminate a player’s contract if the player’s 
conduct and actions do not comport with standards of good morals and 
citizenship.22  However, the NBA Commissioner has also used this clause 
to impose punishment for player transgressions.23  In addition, through 
collective bargaining, some professional sports leagues have adopted more 
specific provisions covering their commissioners’ authority to discipline 
players for acts committed outside the course of play.  While MLB and the 
NBA have not adopted such policies, the NFL and NHL have done so.24   
In 2007, the NFL implemented its new Personal Conduct Policy (NFL 
PCP).25  The NFL PCP requires that “[a]ll persons associated with the 
 
J. Mitten & Timothy Davis, Athlete Eligibility Requirements and Legal Protection of Sports 
Participation Opportunities, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 103-04 (2008).  In this regard, as 
noted above, the scope of the commissioner’s authority to discipline stemming from these 
documents is agreed upon by both management and labor (that is, by the league and the 
players’ union). 
20 See Pachman, supra note 13, at 1418-19.  Some professional sports leagues also have 
policies related to drug use—both performance-enhancing substances, like steroids, and 
recreational drugs, such as cocaine—that impose mandatory punishment on the athlete that 
has violated the policy.  The reasons for these policies and the controversies surrounding 
them have been extensively written about elsewhere.  See Mark M. Rabuano, Note, An 
Examination of Drug-Testing as a Mandatory Subject of Collective Bargaining in Major 
League Baseball, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 439 (2002); Brent D. Showalter, Comment, 
Steroid Testing Policies in Professional Sports: Regulated by Congress or the Responsibility 
of the Leagues, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 651 (2007); David M. Wachutka, Note, Collective 
Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports: The Proper Forum for Establishing 
Performance-Enhancing Drug Testing Policies, 8 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 147 (2007).  As 
these topics relate only tangentially to the topic of this Essay, we have excluded them from 
our analysis. 
21 See Carrie A. Moser, Penalties, Fouls, and Errors: Professional Athletes and Violence 
Against Women, 11 SPORTS LAW. J. 69, 75 (2004). 
22 See Sean Bukowski, Note, Flag on the Play: 25 to Life for the Offense of Murder, 3 
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 106, 110 (2001) (explaining that a former NBA team, the Golden 
State Nuggets, was able to void the contract of one of its players after he choked the team’s 
coach). 
23 See Trebon, supra note 16, at 92. 
24 See Robert Ambrose, Note, The NFL Makes It Rain: Through Strict Enforcement of Its 
Policy, the NFL Protects Its Integrity, Wealth, and Popularity, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1069, 1094-1100 (2008) (comparing and contrasting the disciplinary powers of the four 
major sports leagues). 
25 See NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY (2007), available at 
http://www.nflplayers.com/images/fck/NFL Personal Conduct Policy 2008.pdf; Mahone, 
supra note 17, at 181.  The NFL Personal Conduct Policy (NFL PCP) replaced the NFL’s 
Violent Crime Policy, which granted the commissioner the authority to discipline players 
charged with any crime of violence.  See Ambrose, supra note 24, at 1086-87.  Interestingly, 
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NFL,” including the players, “avoid ‘conduct detrimental to the integrity of 
and public confidence in the National Football League.’”26  An athlete can 
be punished for such detrimental conduct, even if his actions do not result 
in a criminal conviction.27  This approach is in stark contrast to the NFL’s 
previous conduct policy, which required the NFL Commissioner to 
withhold punishment of an athlete unless there was a conviction or some 
form of plea by the athlete.28 
With the new NFL PCP in place, the Commissioner may discipline the 
athlete at any time—once the league has conducted an investigation—so 
long as he satisfies a proportionality requirement: “The specifics of the 
disciplinary response will be based on the nature of the incident, the actual 
or threatened risk to the participant and others, any prior or additional 
misconduct (whether or not criminal charges were filed), and other relevant 
factors.”29  Such discipline may include probation, fines, suspension, or 
even banishment from the league.30  In addition, the Commissioner may, 
separate and apart from any punishment he imposes, require the 
misbehaving athlete to participate in counseling and other education 
programs.31  However, the athlete does have the right to appeal any 
discipline imposed by the Commissioner through Article XI of the 
collective bargaining agreement and the NFL Constitution and Bylaws.32 
The NHL has also adopted a similar type of policy in its Behavioral 
Health Program (BHP).33  This policy allows the NHL Commissioner to 
require a player to attend counseling sessions if he has a history of criminal 
behavior.34  Interestingly, the Commissioner not only has sole discretion in 
 
the NFL PCP was not collectively bargained, though it appears that the NFL Players 
Association did acquiesce to the policy.  See Marks, supra note 17, at 1584-85. 
26 NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, supra note 25, at 1.  Such detrimental behavior includes 
domestic violence, theft, sex offenses, disorderly conduct, fraud, possessing a weapon in any 
workplace setting, criminal offenses related to steroids and other prohibited substances, 
dangerous actions that put the safety of another person(s) at risk, and “conduct that 
undermines or puts at risk the integrity and reputation of the NFL.”  Id. at 1-2. 
27 Id. at 1 (“Persons who fail to live up to this standard of conduct are guilty of conduct 
detrimental [to the league] and subject to discipline, even where the conduct itself does not 
result in conviction of a crime.”). 
28 See Mahone, supra note 17, at 185. 
29 NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, supra note 25, at 2. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 3. 
33 See Trebon, supra note 16, at 91. 
34 See The Clean Sports Act of 2005 and the Professional Sports Integrity and 
Accountability Act: Hearing on S. 1114 and S. 1334 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 
Science, and Transp., 109th Cong. 47 (2005) (statement of Ted Saskin, Executive Director, 
National Hockey League Players Association). 
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deciding whether to require such counseling, but his decision is not 
reviewable by an arbitrator, as is the case with other NHL disciplinary 
decisions.35  The BHP has four stages.  In the first stage, the player attends 
counseling, but is not subject to any other penalty.36  In the second stage, 
the player continues treatment, but the NHL can suspend the player without 
pay.37  In the third stage, the NHL automatically suspends the player for six 
months.38  In the final stage, the NHL suspends the player without pay for 
one year with no guarantee of reinstatement.39 
Once an athlete is disciplined in one of the main professional sports 
leagues, the athlete can appeal the decision—depending on the league—to a 
neutral arbitrator, to the commissioner, or to the judicial system after these 
administrative appeals have been exhausted.40  However, as the next section 
suggests, the commissioners’ authority in disciplinary matters has been, and 
in many ways continues to be, plenary in nature.41 
B. JUDICIAL AND ARBITRATOR REVIEW OF COMMISSIONER-IMPOSED 
PUNISHMENT 
Not many cases challenging commissioners’ authority have made their 
way to the courts, but those that have suggest significant judicial deference 
to commissioner determinations.  For example, in Molinas v. NBA,42 the 
court upheld NBA President Maurice Podoloff’s indefinite suspension of 
Jack Molinas for gambling on the Fort Wayne Pistons, the team that drafted 
him.43  Molinas sued to be reinstated to the NBA, but the court found for 
Podoloff, reasoning that eliminating gambling from the NBA was important 
enough to justify the punishment.44  While the NBA did not have a best 
interests clause at that time, the court’s reasoning in the case demonstrates a 
deference to the NBA President’s determinations—at least so far as 
gambling is concerned. 
 
35 Id. 
36 See NHL Round-Up, LCS: GUIDE TO HOCKEY, http://www.lcshockey.com/issues/54/ 
news.asp (last visited May 15, 2009). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 See Pollack, supra note 9, at 1648-49 (noting the differences in the professional sports 
leagues in terms of players’ ability to appeal to a neutral arbitrator). 
41 See Wm. David Cornwell, Sr., The Imperial Commissioner Mountain Landis and His 
Progeny: The Evolving Power of Commissioners over Players, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 769, 
772 (2006). 
42 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
43 Id. at 241. 
44 Id. at 244. 
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While seminal cases do not involve challenges to commissioners’ 
imposition of disciplinary measures, they are indicative of how courts might 
treat such actions.  For example, in Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn,45 the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld MLB Commissioner Bowie 
Kuhn’s denial of Oakland Athletics owner Charles Finley’s attempt to sell 
the contracts of many of his marquee players in light of their impending 
free agency.46  Finley had attempted to trade players such as Vida Blue, 
Rollie Fingers, and Joe Rudi—those that the team would not be able to 
afford when they became free agents—to other teams in order to use the 
added resources to invest in the team’s farm system.47  Commissioner Kuhn 
blocked this move, explaining that it ran contrary to the best interests of 
baseball, the integrity of the game, and the public confidence in it.48  The 
Seventh Circuit held in favor of Commissioner Kuhn, citing the best 
interests clause.49 
In Atlanta National League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn,50 the court 
upheld Commissioner Kuhn’s year-long suspension of Atlanta Braves 
owner Ted Turner for tampering with the San Francisco Giants’ exclusive 
bargaining rights with outfielder Gary Matthews.51  The court again pointed 
to the nearly unbridled authority of the MLB Commissioner: “[We have] no 
hesitation in saying that the defendant Commissioner had ample authority 
to punish plaintiffs in this case, for acts considered not in the best interests 
of baseball.”52  However, the court did note that the Commissioner’s 
discretion to impose punitive sanctions against an owner who violated MLB 
rules and directives was limited to the enumerated list of punishments in the 
Major League Agreement.53  Despite this limitation, the case was seen as 
yet another victory for broad commissioner authority and power. 
Commissioners have not fared quite so well, however, with 
arbitrators.54  The highly publicized case of Steve Howe is a good example.  
In 1991, after six previous recreational drug violations, Howe entered an 
Alford plea—pleading guilty without actually admitting guilt—on charges 
 
45 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978). 
46 Id. at 530-31. 
47 Id. at 531. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 539. 
50 432 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ga. 1977). 
51 Id. at 1217. 
52 Id. at 1220. 
53 Id. at 1225. 
54 The players’ right to arbitral review arises out of the respective league’s collective 
bargaining agreement.  See, e.g., Joseph A. Kohm, Jr., Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption: It’s 
Going, Going . . . Gone!, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1231, 1244 (1996) (noting that MLB players’ 
right to arbitration was gained through the collective bargaining agreement). 
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of attempting to purchase cocaine and possession of cocaine.55  In response, 
Commissioner Vincent suspended Howe for life.56  Howe, through the 
Major League Baseball Players Association, filed a grievance before 
MLB’s arbitrator challenging the lifetime ban.57  The arbitrator determined 
that Commissioner Vincent’s lifetime suspension of Howe was “without 
just cause”58 and amended Howe’s punishment to a year-long suspension 
and a stringent drug-testing and drug-education program.59  The arbitrator 
noted that while the Commissioner had a “reasonable range of discretion” 
in addressing such drug violations, the punishment was not commensurate 
with Howe’s transgressions, particularly in light of Howe’s psychiatric 
illness.60  The arbitrator reached this decision despite recognizing the 
importance of eradicating drug use in MLB.61  While this decision gives far 
less deference to the Commissioner’s actions, it is because drug-related 
offenses were then—as they continue to be for the most part now—
governed by different disciplinary standards and punishment than other 
misbehavior committed by players.62 
The case of former NBA star Latrell Sprewell provides another 
example of how arbitrators are less willing to give commissioners the same 
degree of deference as the judiciary.  While playing for the Golden State 
Warriors, Sprewell attacked and choked his coach, P.J. Carlesimo, during 
practice on December 1, 1997.63  In response, NBA Commissioner David 
Stern suspended Sprewell for one year.64  Sprewell, through the National 
Basketball Players Association, appealed the decision to an arbitrator.  The 
 
55 Pollack, supra note 9, at 1692-93.  From 1982-1988, Howe was suspended six times 
for recreational drug violations.  Id. at 1692.  In 1988, upon Howe’s sixth offense, 
Commissioner Kuhn gave Howe a lifetime suspension.  Id.  A couple of years later, 
Commissioner Fay Vincent—who succeeded Commissioner Kuhn—reinstated Howe under 
certain stringent conditions centering around a drug aftercare program.  Id. 
56 Id. at 1693; Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Comm’r of Major League 
Baseball (Steve Howe Arbitration Decision), in UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS AND LEGAL 
ASPECTS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRY 2000, at 579, 582 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course 
Handbook Series No. G-591, 2000) [hereinafter Steve Howe Arbitration Decision]. 
57 Steve Howe Arbitration Decision, supra note 56. 
58 Id. at 583. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 598-603. 
61 Id. at 618. 
62 At that time, the MLB collective bargaining agreement allowed the arbitrator to 
overturn the Commissioner’s punishment if the arbitrator found that there was no “just 
cause” for the punishment.  See Pollack, supra note 9, at 1693. 
63 Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n ex rel. Sprewell v. Warriors Basketball Club, in 
UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRY 2000, supra note 
56, at 469, 481. 
64 Id. at 482. 
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arbitrator reduced the one-year suspension to the remainder of the 1997-98 
NBA season.65  In justifying the reduction, the arbitrator explained that the 
reduced punishment was more commensurate with the seriousness of 
Sprewell’s actions.66  The arbitrator also reinforced the notion that the 
Commissioner’s punishment should be fair in light of the circumstances.67  
In this regard, though the reduction was not as drastic as the Howe case—
nor was it a significantly fewer number of games—the change in discipline 
was noteworthy in that the arbitrator did not grant the Commissioner the 
degree of deference that a court would likely have afforded him. 
Finally, the case of former MLB pitcher John Rocker provides an 
interesting example of where an arbitrator upheld a commissioner’s 
disciplining of an athlete for off-the-court or off-the-field, non-criminal 
behavior, while reducing the severity of the sanction.68  Following a series 
of escalating, antagonistic interactions with baseball fans in New York City, 
Rocker made “certain profoundly insensitive and arguably racist 
statements” to a Sports Illustrated reporter.69  In response, MLB 
Commissioner Bud Selig suspended Rocker from spring training for the 
2000 MLB season; suspended him, with pay, from the opening day of the 
2000 MLB season through May 1, 2000; required him to donate $20,000 to 
either the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) or another organization that promoted diversity efforts; and 
required him to participate in a diversity training program before being 
allowed to play again.70  Rocker, through the MLB Players Association, 
filed a grievance with the MLB arbitrator, challenging the imposed 
sanction.71  
The arbitrator affirmed the Commissioner’s authority to discipline 
players for off-the-field, speech-related, and non-criminal behavior.72  
However, the arbitrator noted that while the Commissioner has a 
“‘reasonable range of discretion’” related to imposing such discipline, the 
penalty must be “‘reasonably commensurate with the offense’” and 
“‘appropriate, given all circumstances.’”73  Based on this standard of 
 
65 Id. at 576 (reducing his suspension from eighty-two games to sixty-eight games). 
66 Id. at 574. 
67 Id. at 573. 
68 Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Comm’r of Major League Baseball (John 
Rocker Arbitration Decision), in UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE 
SPORTS INDUSTRY 2001, at 765 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course Handbook Series No. G-638, 
2001). 
69 Id. at 769 (quoting Bud Selig, MLB Comm’r). 
70 Id. at 770. 
71 Id. at 769. 
72 Id. at 802-03. 
73 Id. at 804 (citing Nixon (Panel Decision 84, Nicolau, 1992)). 
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review, the arbitrator found the Commissioner’s disciplinary measures to be 
excessive.74  The arbitrator noted, in particular, that the seventy-three-game 
suspension was met or exceeded previously only in a handful of cases 
involving serious drug offenses by repeat offenders.75  The arbitrator also 
stated that the Commissioner provided no persuasive rationale as to why 
Rocker’s offense warranted such a severe penalty.76  Accordingly, the 
arbitrator reduced Rocker’s suspension to fourteen days (from opening day 
until April 17, 2000) and his fine to $500.77  The arbitrator did, however, 
sustain the diversity training program requirement.78 
These decisions demonstrate that some arbitrators are less deferential 
toward commissioners than courts have been.  At the same time, even these 
less friendly decisions reinforce the significant power of the respective 
commissioner to discipline players, even if they reduce the severity of the 
punishment.  Moreover, other arbitrators have mirrored the type of 
deference that courts have given commissioners’ actions with regard to 
discipline and punishment of players.  This, coupled with the deferential 
treatment by the judiciary, helps solidify significant power and authority in 
professional sports league commissioners, as their broad powers detailed 
above are largely upheld by any reviewing entity. 
III. THE BOTTOM LINE AND BELOW: MONEY AND FANS 
Armed with plenary power, professional sports league commissioners 
have begun increasingly to flex their best interest muscles to discipline 
players who commit criminal acts off the court or field.  There are many 
compelling reasons why these commissioners are paying more attention to 
athletes’ off-court and off-field behavior and responding accordingly.  Of 
primary importance may be the fact that when a league’s player commits 
criminal acts off the court or field, the league’s image and profitability can 
be significantly harmed.79  When players misbehave, fans may buy fewer 
tickets and less merchandise, and advertising revenue may decrease, as 
sponsors may not want to be affiliated with such criminal activity.80  
Indeed, “[i]f and when fans replace admiration with disgust as a result of 
the actions of certain players, the star quality of athletes ceases to be a 
 
74 Id. at 805-06. 
75 Id. at 805. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 806. 
78 Id. 
79 Note, Out of Bounds: Professional Sports Leagues and Domestic Violence, 109 HARV. 
L. REV. 1048, 1051 (1996) [hereinafter “Out of Bounds”]. 
80 See Bukowski, supra note 22, at 107-08. 
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useful commodity for the league.”81  This potential problem may be 
exacerbated by the increased media attention that athletes’ criminal 
activities receive.82  In light of this situation, it is understandable that 
commissioners will impose more frequent and severe punishment to 
publicize their respective league’s disapproval of such behavior, and 
thereby minimize bad publicity and attendant financial damage. 
While a league’s best interest could be limited to its bottom line, 
according to the leagues themselves, private punishment of athletes also 
seems to be motivated by broader social concerns.83  Interestingly, these 
concerns appear to track those that traditionally justify public criminal 
punishment—namely, retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and individual 
virtue.  In particular, a league’s punitive response to fan outrage over an 
athlete’s criminal acts is likely to constitute a response to retribution- or 
deterrence-oriented demands.  Even if an athlete is punished by the public 
criminal justice system, fans may demand action by leagues because of the 
perception that athletes are favorably treated by the criminal justice 
system—by police, judges, and juries84—or that public punishment will fail 
to have the intended retributive or deterrent effect.85  In imposing 
punishment, leagues not only refer to sources of power such as their best 
interest authority, but also engage in general moral denunciation of athlete 
misconduct.86 
Leagues also embrace rehabilitative goals of punishment to help their 
players learn to separate on-court aggression from off-the-court or off-the-
field situations and relationships.  In order to reach the elite level of play in 
the professional leagues, most athletes must adopt a certain level of 
aggression, intimidation, and even violence.87  Unfortunately, this 
aggression and violence sometimes seeps into their personal lives, in the 
 
81 Id. at 108. 
82 See Robinson, supra note 4, at 1323-25. 
83 See Jim Rose et al., Regulating Coaches’ and Athletes’ Behavior off the Field, 4 
DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141, 142 (2007) (discussing whether off-court and 
off-field misconduct causes fans to become more cynical about the sport). 
84 See Michael M. O’Hear, Blue-Collar Crimes/White-Collar Criminals: Sentencing Elite 
Athletes Who Commit Violent Crimes, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 427, 432 (2001). 
85 League punishment in the form of fines and suspensions may have significant financial 
effect on the player, achieving retributive goals more effectively than traditional public 
punishment.  In addition, league punishment may come swifter and more certain than public 
punishment—qualities that enhance punishment’s deterrent effect.  See Deana A. Pollard, 
Sex Torts, 91 MINN. L. REV. 769, 813 (2007).  Such private punishment may have both 
specific and general deterrent effects.  See Bukowski, supra note 22, at 108. 
86 See infra notes 137-44 and accompanying text. 
87 See Ellen E. Dabbs, Intentional Fouls: Athletes and Violence Against Women, 31 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 167, 170 (1998). 
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form of crimes such as domestic violence and sexual assault.88  
Understandably, leagues do not want to become “breeding ground[s] for 
domestic violence and sexual assault scandals.”89  Thus, leagues punish 
their players in an effort to send a strong message that such behavior is 
unacceptable and that athletes must channel their feelings of dominance into 
their sport, not their personal lives.90  Leagues may also want their players 
to get better, heal, and learn from their mistakes.91  Accordingly, 
commissioners will also hand down punishment that includes counseling to 
help the players address the issues that led them to commit such criminal 
acts.92 
Finally, leagues are also concerned with the individual character of 
their athletes.  For better or worse, players are role models for millions of 
kids.93  The public criminal justice system sometimes takes this fact into 
account in imposing punishment against criminal athletes.94  Sports leagues 
also recognize the public status that athletes enjoy, and attempt to maintain 
a good image through regulatory measures such as background checks and 
dress codes.95  When commissioners punish players for criminal activity off 
the court or field, it reinforces the requirement of good character that is 
projected to the public. 
In sum, sports leagues impose private punishment by appealing to 
purposes that are more easily recognized as public in nature.  They appear 
to do this even though they clearly have ample powers to punish through 
the private authorities discussed above in Part II.A.  This suggests that 
 
88 See Moser, supra note 21, at 70. 
89 See id.; see also O’Hear, supra note 84, at 430-31; Robinson, supra note 4, at 1321. 
90 See Out of Bounds, supra note 79, at 1052 (“Particularly in sports such as football and 
hockey, ‘[w]here assaults that would be illegal off the field become an accepted, even 
celebrated’ part of the game, it is imperative that the league send a message that such 
conduct is inappropriate outside the confines of the game.”). 
91 See Bukowski, supra note 22, at 111, 117. 
92 See, e.g., NAT’L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, NBPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENT art. VI, § 5 (2005), available at http://www.nbpa.com/cba_articles.php 
(requiring players who commit off-court violent acts to undergo a clinical evaluation and, if 
warranted, counseling to address such behavior); see also Bukowski, supra note 22, at 117 
(describing a similar counseling program in the NHL). 
93 See Holly M. Burch & Jennifer B. Murray, An Essay on Athletes as Role Models, 
Their Involvement in Charities, and Considerations in Starting a Private Foundation, 6 
SPORTS LAW. J. 249, 250-51 (1999). 
94 See infra note 138. 
95 See Scott Burnside, Dress Code Suits NHLers Just Fine, ESPN.COM, Oct. 20, 2005, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/columns/story?id=2198862 (referring to the NHL dress code 
included in the collective bargaining agreement); Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, NBA Player Dress 
Code, Oct. 20, 2005, http://www.nba.com/news/player_dress_code_051017.html; infra note 
136. 
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leagues believe such public purposes are necessary to justify their punitive 
decisions, despite the existence of contractual authority to accomplish the 
same.96  In doing so, sports leagues seemingly punish under the conceit that 
punishment serves broader social aims rather than mere monetary interest.  
On the one hand, we should applaud a private entity that takes such aims 
into account in its decision making.  On the other hand, it is unclear 
whether and how such public purposes should be used in the private context 
to engage in an act as fraught as punishment.  To begin addressing this 
question, we explore below the relationship between private and public 
punishment, and consider whether league punishment may be 
conceptualized as either one or the other.  Although, as a general matter, 
private entities like sports leagues are free to rationalize their decisions and 
actions in whatever way they choose, we suggest that public purposes fall 
short of full justification (that is, to the extent they are even necessary) due 
to both legal and cultural limitations that exist in most private contexts. 
IV. THE RISE OF PRIVATE PUNISHMENT 
We begin by emphasizing that punishment of a criminal athlete by a 
sports league is punishment, although imposed privately rather than by the 
state through its laws.  Although in much of criminal law scholarship the 
term punishment primarily refers to that imposed by the state, it is in fact a 
much broader concept.  As Kent Greenawalt defines it, “punishment” 
occurs whenever “persons who possess authority impose designedly 
unpleasant consequences upon, and express their condemnation of, other 
persons who are capable of choice and who have breached established 
standards of behavior.”97 
Increasingly, this broader understanding of punishment has entered 
criminal law scholarship over the past several decades, encompassing topics 
as diverse as regulation through social norms, restorative justice, and 
private policing.98  This scholarship tends to divide into one of two models 
 
96 It is important to distinguish between public purposes that purportedly justify the 
contractual provisions of punishment—which remains a completely private matter between a 
league and its athletes—and public purposes that directly justify the imposition of 
punishment itself. 
97 See Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 48, 48 (Leo 
Katz et al. eds., 1999). 
98 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Privatizing Criminal Law: Strategies for Private Norm 
Enforcement in the Inner City, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1859 (1999) (discussing social norms); Ric 
Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911 (2007) (addressing 
private policing and restorative justice); David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. 
REV. 1165 (1999) (detailing private policing).  Private punishment that does not enjoy an 
appreciable level of normative desirability or legitimacy, like vigilantism, is not part of our 
discussion here.  Cf. Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. 
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of privatization: (1) cooperative or (2) exclusive.  The cooperative model 
posits that the continued vitality of public criminal law depends on the 
active participation of private individuals or groups that have a stake in the 
law’s effectiveness.99  This is particularly true in those areas of the country, 
like the inner cities of Boston and Chicago, where tension and distrust 
between the police and the community run so high that the state has lost its 
moral legitimacy.100  Boston’s Ten Point Coalition and Chicago’s prayer 
vigils, wherein Black churches utilize their moral authority to legitimate 
state-sponsored, anti-crime programs, are examples of cooperative 
approaches that seek to counteract the effect of state delegitimization and 
secure citizen cooperation.101  Although it can be said that the law often 
encourages and relies on private entities—to report crime, identify 
criminals, testify in court, and even participate to varying degrees in the 
capture of perpetrators102—the new privatization thesis takes a much 
stronger position in critiquing public criminal justice.  Its advocates assert 
that private cooperation is “essential” to the future viability of public 
criminal law to control crime precisely because of the public, or state-
centered, nature of that law.103 
The other dominant model of privatization focuses not on cooperation, 
but exclusion.  While the cooperative model offers a framework for private 
entities to opt in to the public criminal justice system where the incentives 
and pressures to opt out are powerful,104 the exclusive model represents an 
opt-out in favor of private resolution that better suits the parties involved in 
the crime.  Restorative justice and private policing are two well-known 
examples of the exclusive model.105  Restorative justice, in its strongest 
 
REV. 573, 583 (excluding vigilantism from the definition of “private policing” because of its 
“lack of a close connection to formal law”). 
99 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 98, at 1862 (arguing that private groups like the Black 
church or juvenile groups may be more effective in controlling crime in the inner city than 
the state). 
100 See id. at 1861. 
101 See id. at 1863-66. 
102 The Supreme Court has been careful to allow the police room to obtain citizen 
cooperation.  See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004) (acknowledging that citizen 
cooperation is “vital” to effective policing); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 
(1971) (“But it is no part of the policy underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the apprehension of 
criminals.”); see also supra Part IV (discussing private policing). 
103 Kahan, supra note 98, at 1860. 
104 Thus, Kahan’s thesis is most applicable to crime-ridden, inner-city communities, 
where he observes that the moral authority of the state has been “enfeebled.”  Id. at 1861. 
105 See Simmons, supra note 98, at 911 (proposing that restorative justice and private 
policing are “forging an alternative private criminal justice system”).  As we describe below, 
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form, contemplates a community-based response to crime that precludes 
public punishment (and process) in the conventional sense of that term.106  
The modern movement is based on the premise that public criminal law 
both neglects the needs of the victim and excessively punishes the 
offender.107  Instead, the community should directly address the 
reintegration of both the victim and offender so as to heal the rift that has 
been created by crime.108 
Private policing is also a means of accessing direct resolution of crime 
that bypasses the public criminal justice system.  Recent scholarship on 
private policing has revealed that the phenomenon of private policing has 
grown rapidly and may now be seen as overtaking public policing in some 
measures.109  Private security guards hired by corporations and other private 
organizations are the most common examples of private policing at work 
today.110  When private security—for example, a guard at a department 
store—detects a crime (such as theft of merchandise), the victim—in this 
case the department store—has the choice to call the police and instigate 
public prosecution, or to handle the matter itself by seeking a private 
remedy, such as repayment for lost property111 or ejection from the store.112  
For private entities that seek to avoid the publicity and other costs of 
 
discipline in the employment context may also be classified as an instance of private 
punishment.  See infra notes 122-129 and accompanying text. 
106 See Leena Kurki, Restorative and Community Justice in the United States, 27 CRIME 
& JUST. 235, 264 (2000) (observing that some proponents of restorative justice view it as “an 
ideal of individualized and informal justice in which people handle their conflicts without 
state interference”); cf. Kenworthey Bilz, The Puzzle of Delegated Revenge, 87 B.U. L. REV. 
1059, 1061 (2007) (positing that our willingness to delegate revenge to a third-party—often, 
the state—must be explained).  Such strong forms of restorative justice are traced back to 
practices of indigenous tribes and ancient civilizations.  See id. at 1095-96.  The weaker 
forms that are currently found in the United States usually involve rehabilitative or 
diversionary programs relating to mostly minor offenses and juveniles only.  See Zvi D. 
Gabbay, Holding Restorative Justice Accountable, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 85, 101-
10 (2006) (describing programs in Wisconsin, Iowa, Virginia, and New York). 
107 See Simmons, supra note 98, at 913-16. 
108 See Kurki, supra note 106, at 263. 
109 See Joh, supra note 98, at 575 (noting that private police are sometimes considered 
“the first line of defense in the war against terrorism”); Simmons, supra note 98, at 920-21 
(observing that spending on private security doubles that on public police); David Alan 
Sklansky, Private Police and Democracy, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 89 (2006) (“Today 
private guards greatly outnumber sworn law enforcement officers throughout the United 
States, and the gap continues to widen.”).  As Sklansky and Joh point out, private policing 
takes varied forms.  See Joh, supra note 98, at 610 tbl.1; Sklansky, supra, at 92-94. 
110 Cf. Sklansky, supra note 98, at 1168 (describing the explosive growth of the private 
security industry). 
111 See Simmons, supra note 98, at 939-40 (discussing restitution-demand letters). 
112 See Joh, supra note 98, at 589 (discussing a case of banishment from Macy’s). 
2009] OFF-COURT MISBEHAVIOR 589 
pursuing public prosecution, such remedies offer an attractive solution to 
the problem of crime.113 
Although grouped together as models and examples of privatization, 
each of the approaches described above differs from the other in significant 
ways.  Two points of distinction are particularly noteworthy: the level of 
privatization that the examples display and, relatedly, the purposes that they 
pursue. 
Of the three, the cooperative programs in Boston and Chicago are 
obviously the least private.  Although they emphasize and depend on 
private participation, the goal of each program is ultimately to bolster the 
effectiveness of the public criminal justice system by highlighting the 
common ground that exists between the community and the state—that is, 
the desire to reduce violence and crime.  That common ground, however, is 
decidedly publicly oriented in the sense that both the state and the private 
entities that cooperate with the state seek to place offenders within the 
public criminal justice system, which pursues the broad societal goals of 
criminal law such as retribution.  Thus, cooperative programs seemingly 
espouse the governance model of organization—concerned with “values 
such as integrity, the accommodation of interests, and morality”—as does 
the public police.114 
The restorative justice movement has more “private” features than the 
cooperative programs of Boston and Chicago, but it also embraces public 
characteristics as well.  On the one hand, its rejection of state-imposed 
retributive punishment in favor of private resolutions that meet the specific 
needs of the victim and the offender suggests that achieving restorative 
justice is a highly private affair.115  Most notably, unlike in the traditional 
public system, the victim has a more significant role in the restorative 
process.116  At the same time, the role of the public—here, the 
community—is also emphasized in the course of promoting reintegration of 
 
113 See id. at 590. 
114 See id. at 591 (referring to Philip Selznick’s distinctions). 
115 See, e.g., A Healing Circle in the Innu Community of Sheshashit, JUSTICE AS HEALING: 
A NEWSLETTER ON ABORIGINAL CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE (Native Law Centre, Saskatoon, 
Saskatchewan, Can.), Summer 1997, available at www.usask.ca/nativelaw/publications/ 
jah/1997/Heal_Circle_Innu.pdf (describing how the circle consisted of ten members, 
including the victim, the offender, five family members, two facilitators, and one court 
liaison). 
116 See, e.g., id. (describing how a “circle of concern and support” organized by the Innu 
Community in Canada took pains to provide a rape victim with “an opportunity to say what 
needed to happen for her to feel that the situation was being made more right,” as well as to 
allow the offender “an opportunity to acknowledge responsibility for his actions”); see also 
Kurki, supra note 106, at 266 (rejecting the suggestion that restorative justice is a part of the 
victims’ rights movement, which has been used mainly to increase punishment of offenders). 
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both the victim and the offender.  Moreover, the movement emphasizes 
values such as restitution, reintegration, and community-building as more 
appropriate purposes of the criminal justice system.117  Accordingly, one 
could fairly characterize restorative justice as also engaged in the purposes 
and values of a governance model. 
Private policing is the most private of the three examples of 
privatization.  Private policing addresses the needs of a “client,” not a 
publicly minded, community group.  Its processes and goals may be entirely 
private, tailored specifically for the customer that the security force is paid 
to serve.118  Thus, the legal context for private policing involves not only 
criminal law, but, more prominently, property law.119  Both the process—
excluding the participation of public police and prosecutors—and the 
goals—vindicating private property rights—render private policing quite 
distinct from the other privatization examples described above.120  In this 
way, private policing follows a managerial form of organization that 
emphasizes “efficiency and goal-achievement” over the pursuit of more 
universal values.121 
A league’s punishment of its athletes is an instance of employment-
related punishment, which resembles private policing.122  Like the 
department store that opts for repayment by, or ejection of, shoplifters, 
employment-related punishment may substitute private restitution for public 
prosecution.  Especially when the crime is work-related, such as 
embezzlement, many employers tend to forgo criminal prosecution.123  
Indeed, one scholar has observed that embezzlement has become a “merely 
 
117 See Kurki, supra note 106, at 265-66. 
118 See Joh, supra note 98, at 587 (“Perhaps the most central feature of private 
policing . . . is its client-driven mandate.  . . . [W]hat counts as deviant or disorderly behavior 
for private police is defined not in moral terms but instrumentally, by a client’s particular 
aims: a pleasant shopping experience, a safe parking area, or an orderly corporate campus.”). 
119 See id. (observing that private policing is conceptualized in terms of “loss” rather than 
“crime”). 
120 Id.; see infra Part V. 
121 See Joh, supra note 98, at 591. 
122 Although there is little written specifically about employment-related punishment as a 
form of private criminal punishment, the idea is often implied.  See Greenawalt, supra note 
97, at 48; Joh, supra note 98, at 589-90 & n.109. 
123 See Joh, supra note 98, at 588.  The preference for restitution over public prosecution 
may be driven by the employer’s attempt to avoid bad publicity, which is particularly 
important to large or well-established financial institutions that highly value their 
reputations.  Or it may reflect reluctance on the part of the employer to lose the employee’s 
services.  See id. at 590. 
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private transaction” in light of the widespread preference for restitution.124  
Such private resolution may seem unremarkable; after all, misbehavior on 
the job—where the victim is the employer or other employees—surely 
implicates primarily the employer-employee relationship, which is usually a 
private one governed by contract.  Interestingly, even if the criminal 
conduct occurs outside of work, suspending or firing a criminal employee is 
considered to be an ordinary function of workplace management.125  Such 
misbehavior may be considered, for example, to diminish the employee’s 
ability to carry out her duties or to affect adversely the reputation of the 
employer—reasons for discipline that are ostensibly found in the 
employment contract.126  In this setting, punishment is grounded in both 
property and contract principles, and may be highly private and managerial 
in approach.  It should be noted, however, that when an employee commits 
a crime outside of work, the employer may lose its ability to exclude 
completely the public criminal law.  After all, most employers are unlikely 
to exercise enough influence on unrelated victims to avoid the public 
prosecution of its employees.  In this sense, any private punishment 
imposed by employers for the off-duty crimes of employees may serve to 
supplement, but not supplant, public punishment of the offender.127 
Punishment by sports leagues may similarly be viewed as largely 
private and managerial, grounded mainly in contract and property law.128  
Certainly, punishment is being imposed by an authoritative private entity 
rather than the state.  The league can easily justify its decision under 
contract law (pointing to the terms of players’ contracts, the league 
constitution, by-laws, and collective bargaining agreements) as well as 
property law (arguing loss of good reputation and will, and decreasing 
ticket or merchandise sales) for misbehavior on and off the court or field.129  
And like other instances of employer-employee punishment, sports leagues 
possess an imperfect ability to exclude public criminal law when the 
criminal act occurs off the court or field. 
 
124 See JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW, AND SOCIETY 311 (1952); see also Douglas H. Frazer, 
To Catch a Thief: Civil Strategies for Handling Embezzlement Cases, 75 WIS. LAW. 6 (2002) 
(describing the motivation to avoid public criminal law in embezzlement cases). 
125 See Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of “Just Cause” in 
Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594, 616-17. 
126 Id. 
127 This is not to suggest that private punishment is “lighter” than its public counterpart.  
See Joh, supra note 98, at 589-90. 
128 Courts appear to view league punishment this way, generally applying minimal 
review of league decisions under the loose requirements of private association law.  See Jan 
Stiglitz, Player Discipline in Team Sports, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 167, 174 (1994). 
129 See supra Parts II.A & III. 
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But there are certain features of league punishment, absent in other 
employment and private policing contexts, which tilt such decisions toward 
a public, rather than private, understanding of the phenomenon.  These 
include: (1) the public nature of punishment, (2) the sense of direct 
accountability to fans, and (3) the assertion of independent moral authority 
to punish by sports leagues or commissioners.  These features should give 
pause to anyone who would reflexively treat league punishment as a purely 
private and managerial matter.  In the remainder of this Essay, we consider 
each of these features in greater detail and discuss their theoretical 
ramifications. 
V. LEAGUE PUNISHMENT: MORE PUBLIC THAN PRIVATE? 
At the outset, it is worth reiterating that employer-imposed punishment 
for criminal conduct outside of work cannot be characterized as largely 
cooperative or exclusive.  Instead, such instances of private punishment 
often stand independently of public law (as opposed to reacting to it); that is 
to say, there is no reason to think that public conviction and punishment 
affects either the decision to punish or the kind and amount of private 
punishment meted out.130  This is because employers typically exercise 
authority under property or contract law, thereby operating outside the 
principles that guide punishment under criminal law. 
On the other hand, the private law versus public law distinction should 
not be overdrawn.  An accurate understanding of any form of punishment 
requires sensitivity to its nature and context in each case.  For example, we 
have observed that league punishment is different from typical instances of 
employer-imposed punishment because punishment by a sports league 
tends to be public.  By this we mean that a league’s decision to punish is 
highly publicized.  This is a far cry from the discretion that many employers 
seek to exercise through avenues like restitution and termination when 
employees commit crimes.131  And even when the employer is unconcerned 
about privacy and makes no effort to preserve it, typical employer-imposed 
punishment does not usually enter the wider public’s consciousness.  In 
 
130 In fact, the first significant punitive action taken by a sports league was marked by 
independence from decisions of the public criminal law.  Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, 
the first commissioner of baseball, banished the eight players involved in the 1919 “Black 
Sox” scandal even after their acquittal by a jury.  See Sigman, supra note 13, at 305-06.  In 
so doing, Landis declared independent authority to punish. 
 There appears to be, however, at least one instance where the public prosecution was 
affected by league punishment.  Marcus Moore, a player for the Colorado Rockies, was 
acquitted of rape and sexual assault, apparently because at least one juror believed that 
“being traded down to the minors was punishment enough.”  Chamberlain et al., supra note 
4, at 556. 
131 See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text. 
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contrast, league punishment has public, social effects that render it less like 
other forms of private punishment and more comparable to state-imposed 
punishment; through coverage by the media and, indeed, the public 
statements of the league itself, league punishment sparks public discourse 
about its occurrence and appropriateness.132 
Why is league punishment so public in nature?  Obviously, part of the 
reason is that professional sports generally attract media attention and the 
criminal conduct of athletes is, for better or worse, of intense interest to the 
public.133  Thus, publicity is almost unavoidable.  But this does not explain 
why a league engages in very public acts of punishment rather than treating 
punishment as a private, employment-related matter.  This approach 
appears to stem from the notion that the league is accountable to the public 
for the misbehavior of its athletes.  Moreover, this notion seems to be 
shared by the league and the public alike.134  The belief in public 
accountability is a second feature of league punishment that resembles 
public, rather than private, punishment regimes.  Sports leagues tend to be 
responsive to the beliefs and demands of the fans much as public criminal 
law is responsive to the beliefs and demands of the political constituency 
(again, for better or worse).135  The commissioner, like a politician or a 
public prosecutor, typically holds press conferences and makes official 
statements aimed at reassuring the public that athlete misconduct is being 
 
132 This holds true even if we compare league punishment to restorative justice.  As 
discussed supra, restorative justice has a public aspect to it–community involvement–but it 
is public on a much smaller scale.  It is theoretically critical of the large-scale, professional 
approach to crime, choosing instead to resolve disputes in an intimate setting with 
punishment tailored to the offender’s and the victim’s needs.  In contrast, league punishment 
reaches a broad public; and while there is some emphasis on individual rehabilitation, 
punishment typically takes the standard forms of fines, suspensions, and terminations.  See 
supra note 29. 
133 See Ambrose, supra note 24, at 1071; Robinson, supra note 4, at 1313. 
134 See, e.g., Ambrose, supra note 24, at 1074 (stating that criminal misconduct by 
players is “‘detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the National Football 
League’” (quoting NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, supra note 25)); cf. Ugolini, supra note 3, at 42 
(observing that the NFL “will ultimately be held responsible, whether in the court of law or 
in the court of public opinion” when players misbehave). 
 Some scholarship in this field suggests that league punishment is appropriate because the 
public criminal law insufficiently punishes professional athletes for their crimes.  See, e.g., 
Moser, supra note 21, at 71 (noting that domestic violence cases involving athletes have a 
36% conviction rate, while the rate for the general public is at 75%); cf. Chamberlain et al., 
supra note 4, at 552 (observing that there is widespread belief that celebrity criminals are 
more likely to be acquitted or receive a lighter sentence than non-celebrities). 
135 See Simmons, supra note 98, at 975 (blaming populist politics for increasing 
criminalization and harsher punishments); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of 
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 510 (2001) (explaining that expansion of criminal 
law has much to do with politics and public opinion). 
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taken seriously—both before and after such misconduct occurs136—and that 
the offender will suffer appropriate consequences.   
As we described above, the contractual sources of league punishment 
often refer to notions such as “integrity,” “public confidence,” “standards of 
morality,” and “fair play.”137  Athletes are also referred to as “role-models,” 
a status that demands moral rectitude and upstanding behavior.138  Such 
rhetoric suggest that something more than simple financial well-being is 
implicated in the league’s policies; accountability to the public includes not 
only bare preservation of the league for the sake of entertaining fans, but 
also the projection of a positive moral image of the sport and its 
participants.139  Indeed, allowing an allegedly criminal athlete to continue to 
collect multimillion-dollar paychecks without interruption would fly in the 
face of commonsense justice and morality (private and public), not to 
mention constitute a very poor life lesson for watchful children. 
Moreover, a league’s moral rhetoric often extends beyond the reasons 
that underlie contractual language.  For example, when NFL Commissioner 
Roger Goodell imposed an indefinite suspension on Michael Vick for 
dogfighting and gambling, the letter he issued did not limit itself to the 
various agreements or employment conditions that surely would have 
sufficed to justify his decision.  Commissioner Goodell went further, calling 
Vick’s actions “illegal, . . . cruel and reprehensible,” and his association 
with betting as exposing him to “corrupting influences.”140  In his letter to 
 
136 See, e.g., Darin Gantt, Teams Wary of Troublemakers in Draft, THE HERALD (S.C.), 
Apr. 22, 2007, at 1D (reporting new emphasis on background searches for the NFL draft). 
137 See supra Part II.A. 
138 See Chamberlain et al., supra note 4, at 557 (referring to a 1983 case involving three 
Kansas City Royal baseball players who received a higher-than-normal sentence for 
attempted cocaine possession); Robinson, supra note 4, at 1328 (arguing that professional 
athletes are sometimes held to higher standards and expected to “conform to the public’s 
image of ‘flawless human beings’”). 
139 See Goodell Suspends Pacman, Henry for Multiple Arrests, ESPN.COM, May 17, 
2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2832015 (quoting Roger Goodell, NFL 
Comm’r) (“‘We must protect the integrity of the NFL . . . .  The highest standards of conduct 
must be met by everyone in the NFL because it is a privilege to represent the NFL, not a 
right.  These players, and all members of our league, have to make the right choices and 
decisions in their conduct on a consistent basis.’”); see also Robert L. Bard & Lewis 
Kurlantzick, Knicks-Heat and the Appropriateness of Sanctions in Sport, 20 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 507, 512-14 (2002) (describing three sets of rules in the NBA: (1) “rectificatory 
rules,” such as awarding free throws for fouls; (2) rules empowering referees to control the 
game, such as awarding free throws for technical fouls; and (3) rules designed to preserve 
the aesthetics or reputation of the game, such as behavior or appearance rules). 
140 See Vick Suspended Indefinitely by NFL, ESPN.COM, Aug. 24, 2007, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2990157.  Commissioner Goodell went on to 
write: “I hope that you will be able to learn from this difficult experience and emerge from it 
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Adam “Pacman” Jones regarding suspension, Commissioner Goodell 
referred to a “disturbing pattern of behavior.”141  In 2007, along with the 
fifteen-game suspension that he handed down to Mark Bell of the Toronto 
Maple Leafs for drunk driving and hit-and-run charges, NHL 
Commissioner Gary Bettman stated, “‘Playing in the National Hockey 
League is a privilege, and with that privilege comes a corresponding 
responsibility for exemplary conduct off the ice as well as on it . . . .’”142  In 
2001, when Ruben Patterson was suspended by NBA Commissioner David 
Stern for five games after pleading guilty to attempted rape, Seattle Sonics 
team president Wally Walker commented, “The league is sending a 
message.  Much like the NFL, the NBA is holding its players accountable 
for their off-court actions.”143  The moral underpinnings of these punitive 
decisions suggest that sports leagues embrace a governance form of 
organization—which pursues broad social values over narrow, private 
goals—further reinforcing its public rather than private 
conceptualization.144 
If we are correct, and league punishment can be understood, at least in 
significant part, as enforcing public values, the system raises some serious 
concerns.  The first has to do with process.  Although the public is no doubt 
concerned about the preservation of its moral values, our society also 
recognizes the importance of ideals such as equality, fairness, and 
consistency, especially in the context of punishment.  Many commentators 
have noted the absence of any rigorous mechanism to apply these ideals in 
 
better prepared to act responsibly and to make the kinds of choices that are expected of a 
conscientious and law abiding citizen.”  Id. 
141 Pacman Suspended at Least 4 Games for Violating Conduct Policy, ESPN.COM, Oct. 
15, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3643240.  Jerry Jones, the owner of 
the Dallas Cowboys, expressed the hope that Adam “Pacman” Jones “intensify his approach 
to getting better with his social conduct.”  Id.  Because the suspension was not based on any 
criminal conviction, but a pattern of misbehavior, some have argued that it was based on the 
“morals clause” in his contract rather than on any specific violation of the NFL’s conduct 
policy.  See Rose et al., supra note 83, at 142. 
142 See Maple Leafs’ Bell Suspended 15 Games, CBC SPORTS, Sept. 12, 2007, 
http://www.cbc.ca/sports/hockey/story/2007/09/12/bell-suspension.html. 
143 See Ronald Tillery, Patterson Sentenced to Jail, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 
16, 2001, at D1. 
144 Sports leagues even punish for non-criminal, but otherwise immoral, conduct by their 
players.  In 2000, Atlanta Braves pitcher John Rocker was suspended for bigoted statements 
that he made about minorities in New York City.  See Rocker On: Braves Closer Gets 
Suspension and Fine Reduced, CNNSI.COM, Mar. 2, 2000, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/ 
baseball/mlb/news/2000/03/01/rocker_suspension_ap/.  In 2008, hockey player Sean Avery 
was suspended and then cut from his team, the Dallas Stars, after referring to an ex-girlfriend 
as “sloppy seconds.”  Sean Avery Cut from Dallas Stars, USMAGAZINE.COM, Dec. 15, 2008, 
http://www.usmagazine.com/news/sean-avery-cut-from-dallas-stars. 
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the league punishment context.145  The decision to punish, and how much to 
punish, appears to lie entirely in the hands of the individual commissioner 
with little oversight as to the integrity of that decision.146  Without formal 
procedural protections or punishment guidelines, it is inevitable that league 
punishment will lack uniformity among commissioners and among leagues. 
Perhaps even more fundamentally problematic are the ways in which 
wayward athletes are identified for punishment.  Sports leagues have no 
independent means of detecting the criminal misconduct of their athletes; 
they seem to rely on the ever-present media to alert them to such incidents.  
Media reports of misconduct sometimes lead to public outcry, which one 
commentator has argued “could well be the most effective tool” in reducing 
the incidence of athletes’ criminal misconduct.147  Public outcry for 
punishment no doubt generates more prompt, and probably more severe, 
response by sports leagues.  This kind of accountability to the public 
exacerbates the problems that are created by a punitive system that lacks 
procedural protections for offenders. 
Moreover, reliance on public outcry tends to reinscribe the cultural 
limitations that are inherent in any system that reflects popular values.  One 
cannot help but notice how much more outrage there was over Vick’s 
dogfighting incident than over the countless domestic abuse incidents that 
have plagued professional sports.148  And while wife-beating is often 
 
145 See Paul Finkelman, Baseball and the Rule of Law Revisited, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 
17, 28-29 (2002); Bukowski, supra note 22, at 112-16; Lockwood, supra note 10, at 166; see 
also Sklansky, supra note 98, at 1230-33 (explaining that courts have generally held the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to be inapplicable to private police). 
146 See Gwen Knapp, NFL Did What It Had to Do with New Conduct Policy, S.F. 
CHRON., Apr. 12, 2007, at D1 (observing that the NFL’s conduct policy “licenses [the 
commissioner] to be equal parts Wyatt Earp and [Justice] Potter (‘I know it when I see it’) 
Stewart”); see also supra Part II.B (describing the generally high degree of deference by 
courts and arbitrators to commissioners’ punitive decisions). 
147 See Moser, supra note 21, at 86 (discussing public outcry in the context of deterring 
domestic abuse). 
148 See Tracy Clark-Flory, Wife Abuse v. Dog Abuse, SALON.COM, Aug. 17, 2007, 
http://www.salon.com/mwt/broadsheet/2007/08/17/vick; Sandra Kobrin, Beat a Woman?  
Play On; Beat a Dog?  You’re Gone, WOMEN’S ENEWS, Aug. 21, 2007, 
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm?aid=3285. 
 Carrie Moser has argued that the public does express disapproval of domestic abuse, 
referring to fan reaction against then New Jersey Nets player, Jason Kidd, during the 2003 
playoff series against the Boston Celtics (Kidd committed the domestic violence as a 
member of the Phoenix Suns in 2001).  See Moser, supra note 21, at 74-75.  In that case, 
however, the critical fans appear to have been Celtics supporters, making it questionable 
whether the reaction was genuine moral disapproval or merely fan partisanship.  See also 
Knapp, supra note 146 (reporting that despite public clamor, the NFL did not become 
involved in the domestic abuse case against Colts cornerback Steve Muhammad until he was 
convicted). 
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ignored or treated lightly by sports leagues, Vick has been suspended 
indefinitely (with the possibility of banishment) for dog-beating.149  Where 
there is no systematic way to address the criminal misconduct of offenders, 
and public outrage is the impetus for punishment, these types of 
inconsistent and normatively problematic results are likely to continue to 
occur. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Punishment by professional sports leagues cannot be cleanly defined 
as either purely private or public in nature.  Nor can the incentives and 
rationales for such discipline be understood solely through one or the other 
lens.  Rather, punishment in professional sports leagues represents a hybrid 
form of criminal punishment that does not fit neatly into any existing 
paradigm.  Such uncertainty raises serious concerns about the 
appropriateness of league punishment, not just in terms of consistency and 
proportionality, but also of its social function and justification. 
In this Essay, we have sought to launch a discussion about league 
punishment that situates it within criminal law scholarship’s recent interest 
in private punishment as well as its long-standing struggle with theories of 
public punishment.  We believe that the tensions and potential pitfalls of 
league punishment warrant further reflection by sports leagues to better 
define and structure their approaches to punishment. 
 
149 See Mike Bianchi, Ignoring Domestic Abuse Is the Shame of the Sports World, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 5, 2007, at C1. 
598 JANINE YOUNG KIM & MATTHEW J. PARLOW [Vol. 99 
 
